Th eoretical and empirical studies of time allocation decisions for children in developing countries point to a number of determinants of the demand for education and the supply of child labor. Th ese studies can be grouped into two main schools of thought. Th e fi rst is in the vein of the theory of the demand for education, introduced by Becker (1964) . Becker posited that parents' decisions about whether to send their children to school are the result of a trade-off between the expected returns to and the cost of education. Th is cost includes school-related monetary expenditures and the opportunity cost of forgone wages or other remuneration. If the returns to education are too low compared with its cost, parents will choose not to send the children to school and will have them work instead. Child labor can also be considered as the best option when specifi c know-how and skills learned on the job are more profi table than education (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985; De Vreyer, Lambert, and Magnac 1999) .
Chapter 12
The Work-School Trade-Off among Children in West Africa: Are Household Tasks More Compatible with School Than Economic Activities?
Philippe De Vreyer, Flore Gubert, and Nelly Rakoto-Tiana Th eoretical and empirical studies of time allocation decisions for children in developing countries point to a number of determinants of the demand for education and the supply of child labor. Th ese studies can be grouped into two main schools of thought. Th e fi rst is in the vein of the theory of the demand for education, introduced by Becker (1964) . Becker posited that parents' decisions about whether to send their children to school are the result of a trade-off between the expected returns to and the cost of education. Th is cost includes school-related monetary expenditures and the opportunity cost of forgone wages or other remuneration. If the returns to education are too low compared with its cost, parents will choose not to send the children to school and will have them work instead. Child labor can also be considered as the best option when specifi c know-how and skills learned on the job are more profi table than education (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985; De Vreyer, Lambert, and Magnac 1999) .
Th e second school of thought focuses on the impact of various constraints aff ecting the supply of child labor, the demand for education, or both. A fi rst set of constraints stems from imperfections in the markets for labor and land (Bhalotra and Heady 2003) . When a household does not have enough labor to work all the land it owns, it has two options: hire external labor (farm workers) or rent out or sharecrop part of its land. If external labor is not availablebecause of labor market imperfections (frequent in rural areas) or a weak or nonexistent land market-the household may put its children to work. Any factor that raises the opportunity cost of children's time tends to increase their labor participation and reduce their attendance at school. Poverty-related constraints (Basu and Van 1998) and credit market imperfections (Jacoby and Skoufi as 1997; Ranjan 1999; Baland and Robinson 2000; Skoufi as and Parker 2002) may also explain the emergence of child labor and the concomitant fall-off in school attendance.
Many empirical studies set out to identify the factors involved in the workschool trade-off . Many are based on the joint estimation of school attendance and labor participation equations using bivariate or sequential probit models. Th e defi nition of child labor diff ers somewhat across studies. Some studiesincluding research by the International Labour Organization (ILO)-defi ne child labor as "any economic activity conducted by a child"; children whose only work is performing household tasks within the family sphere are considered economically inactive. 1 Other studies adopt a broader defi nition, considering participation in household tasks to be a form of child labor. Although this more inclusive defi nition may seem preferable, grouping domestic and economic activities in the same category amounts to making the strong implicit assumption that the same factors determine both. Analysis of the factors involved in the work-school trade-off would probably be enriched if domestic and economic activities were considered as two distinct alternatives.
On the basis of this principle, we conduct a joint analysis of the determinants of school and work among children 10-14, separating out activities conducted in the household from economic activities. Using the approach adopted by Kis-Katos (2012), we estimate a trivariate probit model using simulated maximum likelihood in which participation in school, household tasks, and economic activities is explained by a vector of variables including the child's characteristics (age, gender, relationship to household head, birth rank, religion, and so forth) and the characteristics of the child's household (wealth, size, composition, activities, and so forth). Th e data used are drawn from Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys conducted simultaneously in seven West African cities (for a description of these surveys, see box O.1 in the overview).
Th e fi ndings show that the determinants of participation in the two types of activity are signifi cantly diff erent. For example, having a household head who is a self-employed entrepreneur increases the participation of children in economic activities in fi ve of the seven cities (all except Bamako and Ouagadougou) but has no eff ect on their participation in domestic activities. Boys participate considerably less in domestic activities than girls, but they have a greater probability than girls of participating in economic activities in two of the seven cities (Dakar and Niamey) . Th ere seems to be much more competition in the allocation of time between economic activity and school than between domestic activity and school.
Th is chapter is structured as follows. Th e fi rst section presents descriptive statistics drawn from the 1-2-3 survey data on schooling and child labor. Th e second section presents the empirical strategy for modeling the work-school trade-off . Th e third section presents and comments on the results of the estimations. Th e last section summarizes the main conclusions and draws some policy implications.
Work and School among Children in West Africa
Phase 1 of the 1-2-3 surveys is an employment survey providing detailed information on economic and domestic activities (taking care of children, the elderly, and infi rm; fetching water and wood; and so forth) of all individuals 10 and older. Th e following discussion concentrates on children 10-14. 2   Table 12 .1, which presents the work participation and school enrollment rates in each city, reveals wide disparities across cities. Th e percentage of Bamako and Dakar (26 percent) , and Abidjan (17 percent). Th e rate of participation in domestic activities varies widely across cities. In contrast, participation in economic activities is low in all seven cities (9-16 percent). Girls participate much more than boys in domestic and economic activities and attend school less than their male counterparts. Table 12 .3 provides information on the average number of hours worked by working children per week. Not surprisingly, children who work without going to school work longer hours on average than children who combine work and school. However, the observed diff erences are much larger for the number of hours spent on economic activities, suggesting that it is possible to combine domestic activities and school, at least up to a certain point. Th e number of hours spent on domestic activities is higher among girls not attending school than for girls attending school (this result does not hold for boys), Table 12 .3 also reveals that whether or not they are enrolled in school, girls spend much more time than boys on domestic activities. Tables 12. 4 and 12.5 show the nature of the work children perform and the type of remuneration they receive. Gender diff erences are also apparent in the breakdown between unskilled and apprentice activities. Except in Lomé, girls have a much lower probability of being apprentices and are much more likely to be unskilled workers than boys. On the whole, these fi ndings suggest that when girls do not go to school, their labor is used to provide the household with income or to perform domestic tasks. In contrast, boys continue to accumulate human capital. Th eir apprenticeships do not raise the household's income, but they give boys the skills to increase their resources in adulthood. Gender inequality in access to education may therefore be coupled with inequality in access to vocational training. Th is conclusion is underpinned by the data in table 12.5, which show that girls in all cities have a greater probability than boys of being paid a fi xed wage; boys have a higher probability of receiving no remuneration in four of the seven cities (Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, and Dakar). Becker's (1964) human capital model considers education as an investment made by autonomous individuals on the basis of their preferences and characteristics (time preference, life expectancy, cognitive skills, and so forth) on the one hand, and the returns to education on the other. Individuals may be more or less constrained in their choices, depending on their capacity to borrow and to make a living while investing in education. In each period, individuals decide whether they continue to invest in education or enter the labor market to get a job based on their qualifi cations. Th e optimal level of investment in education is reached when the marginal cost of one additional year of schooling equals the marginal return to the additional year of schooling. Th is model has been extended to take the trade-off between education and fertility into account (Becker and Lewis 1973) , as well as the trade-off in allocating investment in human capital among children within a household (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 1982) . Th is theoretical framework can be used to interpret some of the statistical and econometric results on the determinants of the demand for schooling and child labor. In this setting, it is assumed that the household head allocates the child's time (excluding leisure). Time may be allocated to schooling, domestic tasks, and market work based on the household's preferences, the immediate and future returns to each activity, and various constraints the household faces. Acquisition of specifi c skills while working may raise future returns on the labor market more than skills acquired at school. Parents may thus decide not to educate their child or to reduce the time they spend at school (De Vreyer, Lambert, and Magnac 1999) . Poverty may be one of the constraints to schooling, whatever the household's preferences and the size of the returns to education. All these factors are closely intertwined and determine, to varying degrees, the parents' decision to send their children to school, make them work, or make them participate in domestic tasks. Our empirical strategy deals with this interdependence.
Modeling the Trade-Off between Work and School
We model children's allocation of time among economic (market) activities, domestic activities, and school, considering these choices to be interdependent and simultaneous. We do not observe the number of hours spent in each activity, but we know whether each child participates in each. We estimate a trivariate probit model in which three latent variables-participation in economic activities, L*; participation in domestic activities, D*; and school attendance, S*-depend on a vector of explanatory variables X; a vector of parameters a L , a D , and a S ; and error terms e L , e D , and e S , which are jointly normally distributed.
Formally, we estimate the following system of equations (written for child i):
where N with
Coeffi cients r jk (with j ≠ k) refl ect the correlation that can exist between the errors of the three choice equations. Depending on whether the choices are independent or not, these coeffi cients are zero or signifi cantly diff erent from zero. Th is model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood using the GHK (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) method (Terracol 2002; Greene 2003) .
Th e vector of variables X includes individual characteristic variables (child's age, gender, migratory status, status in relation to household head, and religion) and household characteristic variables (the household head's gender, the presence or absence of a spouse, the level of education of the household head and his or her spouse, the employment status of the household head, the household size, the number of children, and the level of wealth). Child's age is included to capture the fact that the probability of being in school between the ages of 10 and 14 decreases with age, even in countries (such as Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Togo) where the age limit for compulsory attendance is higher than 14, the probability declines even more in countries where it is lower than 14 (such as Benin, Niger, and Senegal) (see note 2).
Child's gender is also included among the regressors. As suggested by the descriptive statistics, the allocation of time is likely to diff er for girls and boys, with girls having lower levels of schooling on average and being more involved in domestic and market work (except in Dakar and Niamey) .
Relationship to the household head is measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the child is the son or daughter of the head (and 0 otherwise). It is included to capture the fact that household heads may be more likely to invest in the education of their biological children, either for altruistic reasons or because they expect to receive greater support from them in the future. (In the absence of well-functioning insurance markets and retirement schemes, education may be part of an implicit contractual arrangement between parents and their children whereby parents invest in their children's education in order to receive support from their children when they are too old to work.) Th e child's migratory status (measured by a dummy taking the value 1 if the child originates from a rural area) is included to control for the impact of the child's background on his or her allocation of time. Many children reside in households headed by adults who are not their biological parents, even if their parents reside in these households (the 1-2-3 surveys do not record such detailed information). Children born outside the capital city are likely to be foster children. 4 Time allocation of these children depends partly on the reasons why they are in foster care.
Variables for the gender and education of the household head and spouse are introduced to capture household preferences for sending children to school or work. Th e education variable also controls for the fact that highly educated adults may off er better learning conditions to children, choose better schools, and facilitate their insertion into the labor market. An increase in the level of education of the household head and his or her spouse is thus expected to result in a decrease in children's participation in economic activity and an increase in their schooling.
Th e household head's self-employment status is included to control for the opportunity cost of attending school. Because children in households with selfemployed members can be easily employed in the family businesses, they bear a higher opportunity cost of attending school, which may negatively aff ect their schooling investment and increase their participation in market work.
Household size and the number of children in the household may also aff ect a child's time allocation. Th e presence of more children in the household may negatively aff ect schooling and increase participation in domestic tasks if older children take care of younger ones. By contrast, more adults in the household may allow a better allocation of tasks and relax the time constraint, which may positively aff ect schooling and reduce the likelihood of market work.
Th e expected sign of the variable measuring household wealth is undetermined a priori. On the one hand, richer households are less likely to be budget constrained, which should positively aff ect schooling and reduce child labor. On the other hand, richer households are more likely to possess productive assets. By increasing the returns to labor, those assets may increase child labor. As we control for the head's self-employment status, this last eff ect should already be captured, so that the positive impact of wealth should dominate.
Household wealth is measured by a composite standard-of-living indicator, built using the data on household assets and the characteristics of the dwelling.
Th is indicator provides a less cyclical measure of the household standard of living than income or per capita consumption. It is built from a principal component analysis, which summarizes the information in 16 variables: (ownership or nonownership of a car, motorbike, bicycle, radio, television, hi-fi , refrigerator, and sewing machine; number of rooms in the dwelling; whether the dwelling is a private house; connection of the dwelling to the electricity grid; type of water supply (tap or standpipe); and type of toilet (private fl ush lavatory, shared fl ush lavatory, or latrine) (table 12.6).
Th e fi rst principal component accounts for 22-30 percent of the total variance. It is signifi cantly and positively correlated with most of the variables concerned and can be interpreted as an indicator of the households' standard of living or wealth. Some variables (such as child's migration status and the household wealth index) are likely to be correlated with unobserved heterogeneity terms that aff ect the probability of going to school, performing domestic activities, or working. Children that migrated, either on their own or to follow their parents, may adopt diff erent behavior with respect to working or going to school not because they migrated but because migration was a precondition for them to get involved in these activities (an example is children who are being fostered so that they can attend school in the capital). Th e wealth index might be positively correlated with the probability of going to school without having any causal relation to it (if, for instance, the wealthiest households have a higher preference for education). Control variables, such as the education of the household head and spouse, are included in the list of explanatory variables in order to reduce this source of bias, but we cannot guarantee that we eliminated it completely. Without any credible instrument that would allow the use of two-stage least squares to solve the problem, we have no choice but to recognize possible sources of bias when commenting on the regression results in the next section.
Econometric Results
Table 12.7 presents the results of the estimations. Given that the standard deviations of the estimated coeffi cients are potentially biased by error term correlations for children from the same household, the error terms have been corrected.
Th e residual correlation coeffi cients indicate that the unobservable variables have opposite eff ects on school attendance and work (either domestic or market work). Th is fi nding suggests that a form of competition exists between school and work. Competition between school and economic activity (R LS ) appears to be much stronger than competition between school and domestic activity (R DS ). Th e value of the correlation coeffi cient R DS is low and not signifi cantly diff erent from zero for four of the seven cities (Bamako, Cotonou, Lomé, and Ouagadougou), whereas the value of R LS is signifi cant and high for all cities. Th is fi nding is similar to that obtained by Dumas (2004) for Brazil and Kis-Katos (2012) for two northern Indian provinces.
For individual characteristics, the results show that older children have a lower probability of going to school and a higher probability of participating in both market activities and domestic tasks. Th is result is robust to the sample and the specifi cation. In many cities, boys have a higher probability of going to school than girls and a systematically lower probability of participating in household tasks. Th e fi ndings on participation in economic activities are more varied: boys are less likely to engage in an activity outside the home environment in Lomé but more likely to do so in Dakar and Niamey. Th e nature of the child's relationship to the household head is an important determinant of allocation of time between work and school. Biological children of the household head have a higher probability of going to school and a lower probability of working (at home or in the market) than other children. 5 Children who were not born in the capital have a signifi cantly lower probability of going to school and a higher probability of working in all cities except Ouagadougou. 6 Th is result is true only for children who do not reside with their biological parents, however, as the migratory status variable's interaction with the children of household head dummy is always signifi cantly positive. Th is fi nding suggests that children who migrated to the capital and whose biological parents are likely to live elsewhere are more likely to work than to go to school.
One possible explanation of these results is that migration status may aff ect the probability of working or attending school because migration and the choice of activity are part of the same project. Children who migrated with their parents may be more likely to go to school because one of the reasons for migrating was to enhance the possibilities of getting the children educated. 7 Children who migrated without their parents may have moved in order to fi nd work.
Many nonbiological children, particularly children born outside the capital, are likely to have been fostered to an adult member of the household. In Senegal, for instance, about 12 percent of children 15 and younger are fostered, and 32 percent of households host or send one or more fostered children (Beck and others 2011) . Th e fact that these children have a lower probability of going to school than the biological children of their hosting household is consistent with the hypothesis, popular among some international organizations and supported by some academic works, that fostering may have a negative impact on children's well-being (Kielland 1999; UNICEF 1999; Case, Lin, and McLanahan 2000; Case, Paxson, and Ableidinger 2004; Bishai and others 2003) . Early studies on child fostering, such as the study by Ainsworth (1996) , fi nd evidence that does not contradict this hypothesis, but these studies are limited by the nature of the data, which do not allow comparison of fostered children with children in their household of origin.
Using data that match the origin and hosting households of fostered children in Burkina Faso, Akresh (2008) shows that fostered children do not have a lower probability of going to school than the biological children of their hosting household and that this probability is signifi cantly higher than that of their nonfostered siblings. Using 2006/07 data from Senegal, Coppoletta and others (2011) show that adults who were fostered when young have slightly higher levels of education and better positions in their households than adults who had not been fostered. Hence, in the absence of other evidence, we cannot interpret our results as fi rm evidence that fostered children are disadvantaged compared with their biological siblings.
A number of household characteristics also infl uence the time allocation decisions made for children. Having an educated head of household-and, to a lesser extent, spouse-raises the probability of a child going to school in most cities and reduces the probability of the child working. Th is fi nding is consistent with what is generally found in the literature: the presence of educated adults in a household raises children's returns to education by providing fertile ground for learning and encouraging them to spend more time in school and less time working. Th e impact of the level of education of the household head is particularly strong among boys in Abidjan, Cotonou, and Ouagadougou.
Th e level of education of the spouse of the household head is less signifi cant, because it encompasses two opposite eff ects. On the one hand, an educated woman has more employment opportunities and is therefore more likely to delegate domestic work to children in her household, which reduces their chances of going to school (however, results from chapter 7 show that the number of hours of domestic work does not decline when women work for income). On the other hand, an educated women is in a better position to support the children in her household in their school education and therefore to send them to school rather than work.
Th e eff ect of the number of adults in the household on children's schedules is signifi cant in only a few cities. In Bamako and, to a lesser extent, Abidjan and Lomé, the presence of more adults increases the probability of going to school; it reduces participation in domestic activities in most cities. Th ese results suggest a distribution of tasks among diff erent household members. Children in the same household appear to compete with one another to go to school, as an increase in the number of children tends to reduce school attendance. However, the impact is not statistically strong or signifi cant, except in Bamako.
Self-employment by the head of household and the household wealth indicator have strong eff ects on children's allocation of time. Living in a household whose head is a self-employed entrepreneur signifi cantly raises children's participation in economic activities in fi ve of the seven cities (all except Bamako and Ouagadougou), at the expense of schooling. One could argue that the decision of the household to start a business depends on whether there are young children able to help out. If this is the case, entrepreneurship is jointly determined with child work.
Th is fi nding can be interpreted in two other ways. First, labor market imperfections may make it diffi cult to hire external labor. A household head could consequently be driven to rely on family members, especially children. Th is interpretation mirrors in an urban setting the fi nding of Bhalotra and Heady (2003) in rural Ghana and Pakistan.
Second, work experience gained by children in the family business could enhance their employability, encouraging them to opt out of school. Household heads using the labor of their children (or other children in the household) could well be equipping them with skills or specifi c human capital they can then sell on the labor market. Th is interpretation echoes the hypothesis that children's professional experience gained in the fi rst period raises their labor productivity in the second period.
As many empirical studies show (see, in particular, Psacharopoulos 1997; Ray 1999 Ray , 2000 Lachaud 2004 ), household wealth is an important determinant of the time allocation decisions made for children. It has a positive and signifi cant eff ect on school attendance among children in four of the seven cities (Abidjan, Cotonou, Dakar, and Niamey), where it reduces their participation in work (economic or domestic) activities. Th is eff ect is to be expected where access to the fi nancial market depends on the level of household wealth. Higher wealth allows households to relax the budgetary constraint, favoring school enrollment. Given that the wealth variable is not instrumented, one cannot exclude the risk of an upward bias for the wealth coeffi cient estimate in the schooling equation and downward bias in the labor market participation equation. However, given that the education levels of the household head and spouse are included in the equations and qualitatively identical results were obtained in fi ve of seven cities (all but Bamako and Ouagadougou), a true wealth eff ect appears to be at work, at least in some cities.
Conclusion
Th e chapter examines some of the factors infl uencing the allocation of children's time in seven West African cities. It fi nds that both domestic and economic activities compete with school, but many children combine school with domestic activities. Marked diff erences are evident between boys and girls, biological and nonbiological children, and migrant and nonmigrant children, with boys, biological children, and nonmigrant children having a higher propensity for going to school and a lower propensity for participating in domestic tasks and (for all groups but boys) economic activities. Th e propensity to attend school (work) is generally signifi cantly higher (lower) in more educated and wealthier households and households in which the household head is not a self-employed entrepreneur.
Th is last fi nding points to a potential drawback of the standard recommendation of providing credit and other asset-building mechanisms to poor households. To the extent that these mechanisms allow parents to operate their own business, they could actually increase child labor (Del Carpio and Loayza 2012 for Nicaragua and Hazarika and Sarandi 2008 for rural Malawi fi nd results that confi rm this intuition). Th is negative impact on school attendance may be mitigated if children learn specifi c skills that allow them to increase their resources in adulthood by more than the forgone earnings attributable to reduced schooling. Th e data suggest that boys seem to have privileged access to this alternative way of accumulating human capital. If further investigations confi rm this result, it would mean that gender inequality in access to education is coupled with inequality in access to on-the-job training in West African countries.
Notes

